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RES IPSA LOQUITUR
WILLIAM H. McBRATNEYt
Although res ipsa loquitur is frequently treated as a doctrine
or rule of law, it is in fact nothing but a bundle of legal concepts,
each of which may be treated separately. Unfortunately, the
content of such a bundle varies so extensively from time to time
and place to place that the general -title "res ipsa loquitur" has
little or no significance unless it is used with reference to a
particular time and place, and sometimes also with reference to
a particular field of law. Aside from the woolly thinking that
results from the loose use of a single title to cover a number of
concepts, there is also the danger that new rules of law and new
ideas will creep into decisions, although such rules and ideas are
not only not justified by the individual concepts but would cer-
tainly be repudiated by courts or by students of the law were
they to consider them on their merits alone. Under those cir-
cumstances, it seems to me that res ipsa loquitur is worse than a
doctrine incapable of definition; it is a source of ill-considered
rules of law. It is the purpose of this article to sort out and to
analyze the concepts that have gone into res ipsa loquitur, and
to point out some of the consequences that have already resulted
from a failure to analyze those concepts separately.'
t Member, Arizona Bar.
1. To prevent an abundance of case citations amounting to a catalogue
of decisions, only familiar types of cases have been used, and it is suggested
that full citation will be found in the A=xERicAw DIGEST SYSTEM and in
CORPUS JURIS, CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUB1, and AmERICAN JURISPRUDENCE,
under Negligence, for general reference, and under specific titles, such as
Explosives, Carriers, etc., for types of cases of special interest. Good gen-
eral discussion may be found in WIGmIOE, EVIDENCE and in SHEARDiAN AND
REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE. Good discussion and pertinent illustrative material
may be found in the following articles: Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res
1psa Loquitur, 1 U. oF CH. L. REV. 519 (1934); Carpenter, The Doctrine
of Res fpsa Loquitur in California, 10 So. CALim. L. REV. 166 (1907);
Carpenter, Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Rejoinder to Professor Prosser, 10 S.
CALIF. L, REV. 466 (1937); Heckel and Harper, Res Ipsa Loquitur, 22 ILL.
L. REV. 724 (1928); MacDonald, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as
Applicable to Injuries to Person or Property from Electrical Appliances
Not under the Control of the Person or Corporation Furnishing the Elec-
tricity, 3 VA. L. REV. 349 (1916); McLarty, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline
Passenger Litigation, 37 VA. L. REV. 553 (1951); Prosser, Res Ipsa Loqui-
tur: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 10 So. CALIF. L. REV. 458 (1937);
Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Collosion of Cairiers with Other Vehicles,
30 ILL. L. REV. 980 (1936); Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa
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I.
SPECIFIED AND UNSPECIFIED NEGLIGENCE
Res ipsa loquitur cases are sometimes differentiated from other
types of cases on the ground that a claimant need not prove
specific negligence, but need only prove negligence of an un-
specified nature or facts from which it may be inferred that
the defendant was negligent in some manner not further speci-
fied. In cases of injuries to passengers on a railroad, for example,
the mere event of a collision of trains indicates trat the carrier
has been negligent. It does not indicate in what particular the
carrier has defaulted in its duty, and the plaintiff is not required
to prove specifically one act of negligence, such as use of defective
equipment, improper employment of operating personnel, failure
to observe signals, or any of the many other things that might
contribute to a collision of trains, because, as a matter of human
experience, the unadorned fact of collision, coupled with the
high standard of care due a passenger by a carrier, indicates
that the railroad has in some particular defaulted in its duty.
Other courts, however, in attempting to follow -the same line
of thought, have apparently missed the point. In numerous
cases wherein unattended motor vehicles whose brakes have not
been set roll away and crash into persons or property, the courts
have used the language of res ipsa loquitur as though the situa-
tion resembled the situation of a collision of trains.2 Actually,
though, the case of the runaway motor vehicle presents a case of
specific negligence, established by way of inference from the
proven facts, and the only visible effect of comparing it to the
railroad case is to condone the habit of careless thinking on the
part of the judges and attorneys concerning the actual nature
of negligence.
To urge the proposition that the expression res ipsa loquitur
is used only in those cases in which the plaintiff does not know
Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1936); Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Cali-fornia, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 183 (1949); Shain, Res Ipsa Loquitur, 17 So.
CALIF. L. REV. 187 (1944); Shain, Presumptions under the Common and
the Civil Law, 18 So. CALIF. L. REV. 91 (1944).
2. Price v. McDonald, 7 Cal. App. 2d 77, 45 P.2d 425 (1935); Glaser v.
Schroeder, 269 Mass. 337, 168 N.E. 809 (1929); Kolbe v. Public Market
Delivery & Transfer, 130 Wash. 302, 226 Pac. 1021 (1924); Oberg v. Berg,
90 Wash. 435, 156 Pac. 391 (1916). In each of these cases, the opinions
point out that the motor vehicle owner had complete control of the instru-
mentality involved in the accident, and that, therefore, the fact of the acci-
dent presupposes some unknown negligence.
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or cannot prove the nature of the defendant's negligence is,
therefore, not justified. The matter depends entirely upon the
individual court's concept of the matter, especially with reference
to particular types of cases, and no purpose is served in any
event by the use of the phrase. Dangers certainly lie in the way
of its use if it can be made to serve in place of a more complete
discussion of specific situations.
II.
DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Much of the difficulty in connection with res ipsa loquitur
arises from the deficiencies and discrepancies of the definitions
of circumstantial evidence. If negligence is a fact to be inferred
from the specific facts of a particular case, then all evidence is
circumstantial because without an admission of a party, the
deductive process is necessary-and some definitions tend to go
just about that far. On the other hand, there are those defini-
tions which include within the term "circumstantial evidence"
only the evidence of facts that would otherwise be absolutely
irrelevant to the case, but which are, nevertheless, admissible
because relevant deductions may be drawn from them. Writers
who favor the latter definition, however, seem to feel that there
is a nameless gap in the range of evidence; a gap that consists
of evidence of relevant facts from which further relevant deduc-
tions of specific fact can be drawn.3 Realizing, apparently, that
3. Wigmore classifies evidence in three categories: autoptic proferrence,
testimonial evidence going directly to the ultimate issue, and circumstantial
evidence which embraces everything else. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCS § 25 (3rd
ed. 1940); JONES, EVIDENCB § 6 (3rd ed. 1924):
Other terms which are familiarly used to designate different forms of
evidence are direct and circumstantial .... Circumstantial evidence
is that which relates to a series of other facts than the fact in issue,
which by experience have been found so associated with that fact that
in the relation of cause and effect they lead to a satisfactory conclusion.
... These two kinds of evidence are thus defined by the codes in
several states: "Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute
directly without any inference or presumption and which, in itself if
true, conclusively establishes the fact. . .. Indirect evidence is that
tends to establish the fact in dispute by proving another, and which
though true does not of itself conclusively establish that fact, but which
affords an inference or presumption of its existence. [Italics ours]
31 C. J. S. 871 defines circumstantial evidence as evidence which without go-
ing directly to prove the existence of a fact, gives rise to a logical inference
that such fact does exist. The difficulty with reference to res ipsa loquitur is
directly pointed out at 38 Am. JuR., Negligence § 297:
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such evidence is obviously admissible and that it falls into
neither the category of direct evidence nor their concept of cir-
cumstantial evidence, they call it res ipsa loquitur in order to
identify it.
But writers who lean toward the position that all objective
evidence is circumstantial are developing a regrettable tendency
to use the words "res ispa loquitur" to cover an increasing num-
ber of specific situations without sufficient regard for the nature
of proof or the principals of standards of conduct. 4 The un-
attend automobile case is a situation in point. In fact, a case of
that kind is one in which specific negligence is established by
way of objective evidence, and there is no need to make it appear
that novel principles of law are connected with it.5 In such cir-
cumstances, res ipsa loquitur tends to be synonymous with evi-
dence itself without sufficient attention being directed to the
nature of evidence or to the inferences that may be drawn from
particular facts.'
Still other writers assign res ipsa loquitur a variety of other
positions. Some tend to speak of it as a unique form of direct
evidence,7 and others as a unique form of circumstantial evidence.
Another distinction [between res ipsa loquitur and circumstantial evi-
dence] which has been adopted is that where the facts and circum-
stances from which the jury is asked to infer negligence are those
immediately attendant on the occurrence, it has been held to be a case
of res ipsa loquitur. Where they are not immediately connected with
the occurrence, it is an ordinary case of circumstantial evidence.
4. See note 1 supra, articles dealing with common carriers, airlines, and
electrical appliances, for examples.
5. In both California and Michigan, runaway vehicle cases have been
established by principles of circumstantial evidence without resort to res
ipsa loquitur, although California uses the doctrine freely and Michigan
rejects it entirely. Latky v. Wolfe, 85 Cal. App. 332, 259 Pac. 470 (1927);
Bacon v. Snashall, 238 Mich. 457, 213 N.W. 705 (1927). Michigan has taken
the position that there is no need of the use of the expression res ipsa loqui-
tur and denies its validity as a doctrine. Mitchell v. Stroh Brewery Co.,
309 Mich. 231, 15 N.W.2d 144 (1944); Collar v. Maycroft, 274 Mich. 376,
264 N.W. 407 (1936).
6. See 38 AM. JuR., Negligence § 298: " ... it has been said that the
doctrine, strictly speaking, merely takes the place of evidence as affecting
the burden of proceeding with the case, and is not itself evidence."
7. Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 263, 7 P. 2d 228, 231 (1932):
The court said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur rests "not upon evi-
dence .... but upon a postulate from common experience that accidents of
the kind involved do not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence."
See also Tayer v. York Ice Machinery Corporation, 342 Mo. 912, 119 S.W.
2d 240, 117 A.L.R. 1414 (1938); Howard v. Texas Co., 205 N.C. 20, 169
S.E. 832 (1933) ; Plumb v. Richmond Light & R.R., 233 N.Y. 285, 135 N.E.
504, 25 A.L.R. 685 (1922); Eickhoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S.C. 500,
200 S.E. 2d 153, 141 A.L.R. 1010 (1942).
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In both cases it is assigned great probative value. But again
there is no necessity for indulging in any new or original
thoughts concerning the matter. It has long been recognized
that certain forms of evidence have a higher probative value than
others. A written instrument, for example, is considered better
evidence of its content than anyone's statement concerning it.
All sorts of material objects may be introduced as evidence. And
it has long been recognized that some evidence is superior to
testimony.8 Furthermore, very careful consideration has been
given by the law to both presumptions and inferences, both of
which are outside the general scope of this paper except insofar
as the theory underlying the use of inferences has become a part
of res ispa loquitur. The law of evidence has proceeded a very
long way from trials by ordeal to the present use of scientific
techniques, and all along courts of law have been able to deter-
mine by themselves, and without the help of Latin slogans, that
if one person twice gives another one two dollars, four dollars
have changed hands.
Strangely enough, the expression "res ipsa loquitur" in connec-
tion with these various types of evidentiary propositions has
been confined to the law of negligence, although indeed if it were
necessary to use the expression at all, it would long ago have
occurred in the criminal law. However, the law of evidence,
in dealing with the proof of crimes, has been able to get along
without it and still deal adequately with 'the concepts labeled
"direct evidence," "circumstantial evidence," "best evidence,"
etc. Furthermore, the older cases, even in the field of negligence,
were decided without resort to the expression "res ipsa loquitur"
even -though they dealt with factual situations similar to those
that occur today and even though they arose from identical
propositions of law.9
8. E.g., real objects such as weapons, clothing, mechanical devices, the
scene of crimes and accidents, persons themselves to show age, injury, or
color, official documents concerning birth, marriage, and death, judgments,
administrative findings and procedures, and all the various matters of
which courts will take judicial notice. See 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1150 et
seq., and § 1177 et seq. (3rd ed. 1940).
9. See discussion, infra, of Holmes' treatment of the dropping of a
brick from a railway bridge and the falling of a barrel from a warehouse
window.
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III.
CIRCUMSTANCE AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL
A.
Failure to distinguish between the substantive law of liability
and the procedural aspects of establishing it has led to confusion
and to the loose use of words, and the use of the phrase "res ispa
loquitur" makes the matter worse.
Although the words "circumstance" and "circumstantial" are
merely the noun and adjective forms of the same word, the
difference between the two, for present purposes at least, is quite
as great as the difference between substantive and adjective
law.' We use the words "under the same or similar circum-
stances" in jury instructions without much thought for the fact
that all liability, civil and criminal, is predicated upon circum-
stances. If, then, the word "circumstantial" is used on the same
level as the word "circumstance" (with reference -to operative
facts) then all negligence cases are circumstantially established
-a matter of nomenclature that has been touched upon above.
But the word "circumstantial" is not usually given so extreme
a meaning. It usually denotes the evidence of facts, one or
several stages removed from the operative facts, but from which
inferences of fact closer to the operative facts may be drawn.
While these distinctions may seem to be nothing more than either
hair-splitting or an exercise in semantics, they are nonetheless of
serious consequence, for they facilitate the examination of legal
concepts of real importance.
By way of selecting a factual situation free from the usual
implications of res ipsa loquitur, a situation discussed by Holmes
in his treatment of the criminal law will be appropriate:
... if a workman on a house-top at mid-day knows that
the space below him is a street in a great city, he knows
facts from which a man of common understanding would
infer that there were people passing below. He is, therefore,
10. See 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 38 et seq. (3rd ed. 1940) on circum-
stantial evidence, and 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2499 et seq. (3rd ed. 1940) on
presumptions; THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAw 313 et seq. (1898); JoNEs, EVIDENCE §§ 1-104 (3rd ed. 1924);
Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of
Proof, 68 U. OF PA. L. REV. 307 (1920); Morgan, Some Observations Con-
cerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906 (1931); Morgan, Instructing
the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HAnv. L. REV. 59
(1933).
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bound to draw that inference, or, in other words, is charge-
able with knowledge of -that fact also, whether he draws the
inference or not. If then, he throws down a heavy beam
into the street, he does an act which a person of ordinary
prudence would foresee is likely to cause death, or grievous
bodily harm, and he is dealt with as if he foresaw it, whether
he does so in fact or not. If a death is caused by the act, he
is guilty of murder.1
The word "circumstantial" may be used to describe the evi-
dence that "the space below him is a street in a great city"
because from that fact it may be inferred that "there were people
passing below." On the other hand, -the inference is not arrived
at in any mysterious manner since anybody with "common under-
standing" would be able to draw it. So simple a deduction is it
that the court draws it in behalf of, or rather against, the de-
fendant. The court has assumed -to exercise at least as much
deductive power as a man of common understanding and has
found that the inference to be drawn is so obvious that anybody
ought to draw it. The court therefore charges the defendant
with knowledge of the fact that "there were people passing
below" without bothering about direct evidence on the point.
But once it is established by way of inference that the defendant
knew there were people passing below, that fact, along with the
fact that he nevertheless threw a heavy beam into the street,
are circumstances that constitute murder.
In his discussion of negligence, Holmes uses illustrations of
inference that factually bear a strong resemblance to res ipsa
loquitur. But his discussion of the matter has only to do with
the legitimacy of various sorts of inferences:
It has often been said, that negligence is pure matter of
fact, or that, after the court has declared the evidence to be
such that negligence may be inferred from it, the jury are
always to decide whether the inference shall be drawn. ...
... Take the case where -the fact in proof is an event such
as the dropping of a brick from a railway bridge over a
highway upon the plaintiff, the fact must be inferred that
the dropping was due, not to a sudden operation of weather,
but to a gradual falling out of repair which it was physically
possible for the defendant to have prevented, before there
can be any question as to the standard of conduct.
So, in the case of a barrel falling from a warehouse win-
dow, it must be found that the defendant or his servants
11. HoLMEs, THE COm0io LAW 55-56 (1881).
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were in charge of it, before any question of standard can
arise. It will be seen that in each of these well-known cases
the court assumed a rule which would make the defendant
liable if his conduct was such as the evidence tended to
prove. [Footnotes omitted] 12
In some discussions of res ipsa loquitur, it is stated that the
defendant must have control of the particular object in question
in order for the rule to come into play,13 as though some novel
principle of law were involved, although as Holmes points out,
the reason that a defendant must be in charge of the object is
that it could not be otherwise inferred as a matter of logic that
it was his negligence that caused the plaintiff's injury. It should
be noted, too, that the case of the falling brick, as presented by
Holmes, makes out a case of specific negligence by way of infer-
ence. In both these cases, the fact of negligence is inferred from
facts which are in turn inferred from other facts, and the case
may be said to be proved by circumstantial evidence.
B.
The words "res ipsa loquitur" have been used to justify infer-
ences of negligence in cases not founded upon negligence, thereby
injecting inappropriate concepts into such cases and further
clouding the definition of res ipsa loquitur as a doctrine.
It has become so much a custom to infer the operative facts
of liability that courts have tended to go through the motions
of inference when liability may be imposed without it. In most
criminal cases, and in most negligence cases, a standard of con-
duct is involved, and the facts on which liability is predicated
are necessarily arrived at by inference unless the party specifi-
cally admits them. Negligence as a fact, for example, must be
inferred from the facts constituting the specific circumstances
of a particular case. On the other hand, there are fields of law
in which it is not necessary to infer the operative facts upon
which liability may be based. The actual facts or circumstances
of the case are sufficient within themselves.
12. Id. at 124-125.
13. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2509 (3rd ed. 1940) and cases cited, es-
pecially Springs v. Doll, 197 N.C. 240, 148 S.E. 251 (1929); Ross v. Double
Shoals Cotton Mills, 140 N.C. 115, 52 S.E. 121 (1905); Glowacki v. North
Western Ohio R. & P. Co., 116 Ohio St. 151, 157 N.E. 21 (1927) ; 1 SHEAR-
MAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE § 56 (Zipp's ed. 1941); 9 BLASHFIELD, CYCLO-
PEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 6041 et seq. (1941); JONES,
EVIDENCE § 15 (3rd ed. 1924).
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It is a familiar proposition of law that a dealer in food, and
particularly canned food, who sells his product to a person to
the latter's injury is liable by way of implied warranty. 14 The
mere fact of sale, along with the fact of injury, and a demon-
stration of the relationship betveen the two, is sufficient for a
judgment to be rendered against such a dealer. There is no need
for courts to indulge in deduction, nor is it necessary that they
refer to the law of negligence. But courts have nevertheless
applied the words "res ipsa loquitur" to such implied warranty
cases and have inferred negligence from the other facts of the
ease despite the irrelevance of such an inference. I suppose no
harm would be done by so using res ipsa loquitur if it were
understood that the words applied to situations in which infer-
ences were not necessary and were used only for the purpose of
distinguishing such cases from cases in which the operative facts
had to be inferred from other facts. Unfortunately, however, the
expression is used indiscriminately as though there were some
resemblance between the unwholesome food case and the falling
brick case. As a matter of fact, the two cases are not at all
similar; they proceed upon entirely different principles of law
and should not be lumped together. The imposition of liability
in the implied warranty case rests upon a proposition of sub-
stantive law based upon public policy, whereas, on the other
hand, the inference of negligence in the falling brick case is
nothing more than a simple deduction of fact based on human
experience and, therefore, cognizable by the law of evidence.
C.
Questions of public policy and -the standards of conduct are
often concealed behind the expression "res ipsa loquitur" when
they should be dealt with consciously and openly.
Although the question of standard of conduct is a question of
substantive law, itis so intimately related with the law of pro-
cedure that it could very well be described as a mixed question.
So far as this discussion is concerned, cases in which standards
of conduct are discussed or determined do not go to the extreme
of evidentiary cases on -the one hand, nor purely substantive ones
on the other. But, unfortunately, many opinions in which res
ipsa loquitur is applied tend to shuffle the cases about indiscrimi-
14. See 1 WMLISTON, SAI.sS § 242 et seq. (rev. ed. 1948).
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nately and, therefore, to confuse substantive law with procedure,
although nothing is required but decisions concerning the ap-
plicable standard of conduct.
The tendency apparent in most appellate negligence cases is
to standardize the various types of conduct from which infer-
ences of negligence may be drawn and to define the situations in
which negligence will be inferred as a matter of law. And it is
a well known proposition of law that standards are established
both by decisions and by statute:
The rule of the road and the sailing rules adopted by Con-
gress from England are modern examples of such statutes.
By the former rule, the question has been narrowed from the
vague one, Was the party negligent? to the precise one, Was
he on the right or the left of the road?15
It should be noted that, as Holmes observes, the question is no
longer one of negligence but one of precise fact. The law has
already inferred negligence from certain types of conduct, and
the jury need not do it when such facts are proved. Many courts
have used the description negligence per se to describe negligence
so established. I suppose no harm results from the use of such
an expression if it is understood that it refers to those cases in
which negligence will be inferred as a matter of law from certain
types of facts, and that there is no necessity for anyone at -the
trial to infer anything from them.
Many cases in which the expression "res ipsa loquitur" is used
are very little more than a declaration by the courts -that certain
types of conduct will be considered negligence without 'its being
inferred by the jury. But the use of the words "res ispa loquitlir"
obscures the real nature of the process and drags in a compara-
tively new name to designate a type of development that is quite
as old as the law itself and might even be considered an indis-
pensable element of the very essence of law. I see no real reason
why a court should not declare that leaving a motor vehicle
unattended and without provision for its security constitutes
negligence without requiring the jury to infer it. Furthermore,
it is desirable that such declarations of law on the part of the
appellate courts be thoroughly considered by the judges and by
counsel. They should not be hidden behind an expression that
tends to ignore the fundamental problem involved.
15. HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 11, at 113.
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IV.
RYLANDS V. FLETCHER
In the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher,'G wherein water
escaped from a reservoir and damaged a neighbor's property,
the court held the owner of the reservoir liable even though no
negligence could be shown.
In cases following that rule, as Holmes points out:
".... it is no excuse that the defendant did not know, and
could not have found out, the weak point from which the
dangerous object escaped.... Although he was not to blame,
he was bound at his peril to know that the object was a con-
tinual threat to his neighbors, and that is enough to throw
the risk of the business on him."'17
Whether such rule is desirable or not is outside the scope of
this paper, but it is quite pertinent to observe that American
courts repudiate Rylands v. Fletcher whenever they consciously
deal with it,"8 but nevertheless apply it by way of res ipsa
loquitur.
In like manner, the courts have declared in a wide variety of
circumstances that the defendant acted at his peril even though
the same courts would certainly hesitate to lay down such a
declaration of law in those cases were the matter presented to
them squarely.
There are three general methods available for the application
of Rylands v. Fletcher and other severe rules of law under the
guise of res ispa loquitur: (1) by inferring negligence when the
facts do not warrant it; (2) by inferring negligence when mis-
adventure is indicated; (3) by imposing procedural difficulties
upon the defendant. Although the first two situations are quite
similar and overlap very extensively, some clarity will be
achieved by treating examples separately.
(1). After the courts held that the unexplained fact of a rail-
road collision was sufficient to raise an inference of negligence,
the rule was extended to other carriers as though the proposition
were somehow peculiar to carriers rather than to the processes
of logic and human experience. As a consequence, courts have
held -that negligence may be inferred against a motor carrier of
16. L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1868).
17. HOLmEs, op. cit. supra note 11, at 157.
18. 1 SHEARMiAN AND REDFILD, NEGLIGENCE § 160 (Zipp's ed. 1941);
See note 1 supra and especially MacDonald, supra note 1, at 349.
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passengers whenever his vehicle collides with another vehicle in
no way under his control. 19 But such use of res ipsa loquitur is
not justified by the original rule concerning railroad collisions,
nor does it represent a sound declaration of public policy, in
addition to its weakness as a declaration of the law regarding
inferences. Even if such opinions are supposedly based upon
undisclosed public policy, the proper development of the law
could be better served if the courts were to specifically so state
and let the matter be threshed out in the regular way rather than
have it hidden in meaningless jargon. In addition, it is certainly
hard to believe that any court would infer negligence as a matter
of rational deduction in the examples cited when there is so
obvious a possibility that the driver of the other vehicle might
be the sole cause of the collision. Inconsistently, though, the
courts that permit an inference of negligence in those cases do
not hold that motor vehicle operators have the same responsibil-
ity for injury to passengers that common carriers have for
damage to freight.-- In fact, were the question put to them di-
rectly, they would probably deny it.
Of course, it might be argued that res ipsa loquitur does not
have the effect of imposing that liability; it is certainly true that
it does not do so in specific terms. It does, however, give rise to
an inference of negligence where none is justified, and, depending
upon the interpretation of res ipsa loquitur for procedural pur-
poses, leaves the matter to the jury. The court has thus surren-
dered its proper function and lets cases go to the jury when a
non-suit should be directed, and the jury in turn is free to impose
any rule it likes. The substantive law of the matter has therefore
been changed and the defendant burdened with a more severe
test of liability than any that has been actually prescribed
for him.
(2). Many, but not all, of the res ipsa loquitur cases concern-
19. Pickwick Stages Corp. v. Messinger, 44 Ariz. 174, 36 P.2d 168
(1934); Kilgore v. Brown, 90 Cal. App. 555, 266 Pac. 297 (1928); Crozier
v. Hawkeye Stages, 209 Iowa 313, 318, 228 N.W. 320, 323 (1929), in which
the court stated, "The fact of a bus turning over or colliding with another
car, like a railroad train leaving the track or striking another train, is so
contrary to the usual method of operation as to require the defendant, upon
proof of such fact, to establish its freedom from negligence which caused
the result"; Stauffer v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 243 Mo. 305, 147 S.W. 1032
(1912).
20. Crozier v. Hawkeye Stages, 209 Iowa 313, 228 N.W. 320 (1929);
Stauffer v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 243 Mo. 305, 147 S.W. 1032 (1912).
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ing explosives, acids, high powered electrical equipment, and
bottles and tanks under pressure, proceed upon the assumption
that the mere event of injury presupposes negligence. Sometimes
the facts point quite as strongly to misadventure as they do to
negligence and all too often do not point to negligence at all. It
is by way of res ipsa loquitur and not by way of a well considered
declaration of public policy that liability is imposed where "the
defendant did not know, and could not have found out, the
weak point .... -21
Courts are particularly prone to disregard the possibility of
misadventure and to raise an unwarranted inference of negli-
gence whenever the case involves an instrumentality that is a
continual threat to the community. In Rylands V. Fletcher,
the court held, drawing an analogy to the wild animal cases,
that anyone who maintained an object that was a continual
threat to his neighbors acted at his peril, and it did not bother
to invoke an inference of negligence. The modern tendency is
to arrive at the same result, but without saying as much, by
way of the roundabout inference of negligence and the use of
the words "res ipsa loquitur" which, like the indefinite article,
may be applied to anything or to nothing at all.
(3). The procedural effects of res ipsa loquitur, according to
Professor Prosser, are three: It makes "(1) a case sufficient to
get the plaintiff to the jury and avoid a nonsuit, and no more;
(2) a case sufficient to direct a verdict for the plaintiff unless
the defendant introduces evidence; or (3) a case which requires
defendant to introduce more in the way of evidence than the
plaintiff .'22
Although that analysis is sound, it does not elaborate upon
the nature of the evidence the defendant must introduce. In
some instances, evidence of careful inspection, proper use and
timely repair will satisfy the defendant's duty under any three
of the requirements. But in others, the defendant must introduce
evidence that will show how and why the accident occurred or,
under (3) above, prove that the plaintff's injury was the result
of an act of God, the public enemy or a third person. Without
stopping now to examine those defenses and their relation to the
21. HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 11, at 157.
22. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 10
So. CAI". L. REV. 458, 460 (1937).
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usual concept of misadventure, it can be safely stated that the
rule in Rylands r. Fletcher, or the insurer's liability of a freight
carrier, or some other as yet unnamed rules approaching them
in severity, are being very generally applied by way of res ipsa
loquitur.
To add to the confusion, the words "res ispa loquitur" have
been applied to all three procedural variations and to all the other
variations brought about by different standards of duty that
arise as a matter of substantive law. But by using the magic
words, the courts are imposing duties upon parties who would
otherwise not have to bear them, and are laying down rules of
law that the judges themselves would repudiate.
V.
CONCLUSION
Although only extreme definitions, simplified situations, and
common examples have been used in this discussion, the varieties
of res ispa loquitur indicated here nevertheless become numer-
ous. In actuality, the words are applied to all shades of definition
between the extremes and to a great variety of factual situations.
There is, therefore, no common factor appearing in all the cases
and certainly nothing even approaching a uniform boundary for
the area in which the words are used.
The dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs has been
well expressed in the following dissenting opinion in Potomac
Edison Co. r. Johnson:
In this case.., the expression res ipsa loquitur has been
the basis of much of the argument, and I venture to urge
upon the attention of the profession in the state an objection
to the continued use of it. It adds nothing to the law, has no
meaning which is not more clearly expressed for us in
English, and brings confusion to our legal discussions. It
does not represent a doctrine, is not a legal maxim, and is
not a rule.2
Even though res ipsa loquitur does not mean anything, the
words are used in most jurisdictions and are probably here to
stay. There is, however, a tendency toward definition in terms
of various concepts or combinations of concepts. Courts are con-
stantly clarifying and limiting the use of the words in their own
23. 160 Md. 33, 40, 152 AtI. 633, 636 (1930).
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jurisdictions, and in the future, res ipsa loquitur will probably
achieve the dignity of a doctrine, but it will have a different
content from one court to the next. Periodical literature already
reveals a tendency to treat the matter with reference to par-
ticular jurisdictions and not generally. And once it takes on
definite limitations, even though on a local basis only, lawyers
and courts can deal with it relative to the subtantive law and to
the consequent procedures.
As a matter of personal preference, however, I would rather
see the above quoted dissent win the recognition it deserves, and
then hear no more of res ipsa loquitur.
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